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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a sales and use tax case whereby the Tax Commission (Commission) asserts the 
appellants, Gracie LLC and Barnes & Barnes LLC (hereinafter appellants), owe use tax on the 
purchase of their tanning beds and related spa equipment. The appellants operate tanning spas 
under the name Planet Beach. The Commission audited the books and records of the appellants' 
business and determined that Gracie owed $27,966 in use tax and interest and that Barnes and 
Barnes LLC owed $1,315 in use tax and interest. The Commission issued deficiency 
determinations to the appellants, and after an administrative process, the appellants challenged 
the deficiency determination in District Court. There, the court ruled in favor of the 
Commission. 
Course of Proceedings 
The Tax Commission agrees with the appellants' Statement on the Course of 
Proceedings. 
Facts 
The appellants operate six Planet Beach tanning spa franchises in the state of Idaho. In 
the course of their business, the appellanls purchased tanning beds and spa equipment related to 
the tanning beds. The appellants did not pay sales or use tax on the purchase of the beds and 
equipment. For a fee, a customer of the appellants, is entitled to use a tanning bed or piece of 
spa equipment for a certain period of time. All use of tanning beds and spa equipment is strictly 
controlled by the appellants' employees. All tanning beds and spa equipment is controlled by a 
computer and a "T-max" that is hooked up to each tanning bed and piece of spa equipment. A 
customer cannot turn on a tanning bed or piece of spa equipment from inside one of the tanning 
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beds. The tanning beds and spa equipment are turned on by an employee of the appellants from 
the computer at the front desk. 
All use of tanning beds and spa equipment is strictly controlled by the appellants' 
employees as to the amount of time the customer can use the tanning bed or spa equipment. 
Customers normally make appointments. The maximum time a customer can use any tanning 
bed or piece of spa equipment is twenty minutes. A customer can only use an elite tanning bed 
for a maximum of ten minutes. The time limits are for safety reasons, as customers cannot be 
over exposed. Further, no customer is allowed to tan more than one (1) time in a twenty-four 
hour period. 
The Planet Beach website describes the services provided by the franchisees as the sale of 
services whereby the customer receives premier wellness, relaxation, UV therapy, and skin 
rejuvenation. The website indicates that customers receive a "private spa experience" and that 
this experience is "the perfect hybrid of spa services and UV therapy." 
Issue on Appeal 
The issue on appeal is whether the appellants' purchase of the tanning beds and spa 
equipment are subject to Idaho sales and use tax. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
The parties submitted stipulated facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 
Generally, when a trial judge passes upon a motion for summary judgment, the standard of 
review for the appellate court is the same general standard as set out in Rule 56 of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. All facts and inferences are to be construed in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, and a summary judgment is inappropriate if any genuine issue of material fact 
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remains unresolved. Meridian Bowlin~ Lanes, Inc. v Meridian Athletic Ass'n fnc., 105 Idaho 
509, 512. 670 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1983). However, because both parties moved for summary 
judgment based on stipulated facts and on the same theories and issues, there is no genuine issue 
of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co.. 110 Idaho 549, 716 P.2d 1321 (1986); Riverside 
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). The trial court then is 
responsible for resolving any conflicting inferences. Old West Realty, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 110 Idaho 546, 716 P.2d 1318 (1986); Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie 103 
Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). The Supreme Court's review of the issues of the facts in this 
case, as decided by the trial court, "extends only to determining whether the record is sufficient 
to justify the dishict court's findingcs] ...." Ritchie, 103 Idaho at 520, 650 at 662. However, 
when the interpretation of a statute is at issue, the Supreme Court will exercise free review. 
v. McKinley 139 Idaho 526.81 P.3d 1236 (20031. 
The District Court Properlv Held That the Appellants are Liable for the Use Tax 
Idaho Code $ 63-3621 imposes a use tax on the storage, use, or other consumption of 
tangible personal property within the state measured by the value of the property, and a recent 
sales price is presumptive evidence of its value. Every person storing, using, or otherwise 
consu~ning tangible personal property is liable for the use tax. The liability is not extinguished 
until the tax has been paid except that a receipt from a retailer maintaining a place of business in 
this state or engaged in business in this state given to the purchaser is sufficient to relieve the 
purchaser for the tax to which the receipt refers. Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 63-3621(h), a 
presumption exists that all tangible personal property shipped or brought into Idaho by the 
purchaser was purchased from a retailer for storage, use, or other consumption. Accordingly, the 
use of tangible personal property is subject to use tax, unless the party paid sales tax upon the 
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purchase of the property, or the party can establish that the property was bought for resale or that 
he is entitled to an exemption contained in Idaho Code $ 5  63-3622A through 63-2622TT (the 
statutes that contain all of the exemptions from the sales and use tax). 
Thus, the appellants' purchase of the equipment at issue in this case is presumed to be 
subject to the sales and use tax imposed in the Idaho Sales Tax Act. The appellants owe tax on 
the purchase of the equipment, unless they can establish that they are reselling the property or are 
entitled to an exemption. The appellants do not claim they are entitled to an exemption, but they 
do claim they are renting the equipment in the regular course of business. Idaho 
Code 5 63-3622(c) provides the following: 
A resale certificate shall be signed by and bear the name and address of the 
purchaser or his agent, shall indicate the number of the permit issued to the 
purchaser or that the purchaser is an out-of-state retailer, and shall indicate the 
general character of the tangible personal property sold or rented by the purchaser 
in the regular course of business. A resale certificate relieves the seller from the 
burden of proof only if taken from a person who is engaged in the business of 
selling or renting tangible personal and who holds a permit provided for in this 
section, or who is a retailer not engaged in business in this state, and who, at the 
time of purchasing the tangible personal urouerty, intends to sell or rent in the 
regular course of business . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the appellanls can only claim a resale exemption for the equipment if they intend to 
sell or rent it in the regular course of business. For the appellants to prevail in this case, they 
must establish that they rent the equipment to their customers. If the appellants cannot establish 
that they are renting the equipment, then they must pay use tax on the equipment because there is 
no other available exemption that applies. The District Court properly found that the appellants 
were not renting the spa beds and related tanning equipment. 
The District Court's opinion provides: 
In the Court's view, the decision in Boise Bowling Center v. State (93 Idaho 367, 
461 P.2d 262 (196911 is dispositive on the issue raised in this appeal. In this case 
Planet Beach provides tanning and related services to its customers, and it is the 
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combination of these services that the customer is charged for. Each customer is 
provided with the use of an individual room that has been cleaned and sanitized 
by an employee following each customer use, the use of tanning or spa equipment 
and assistance in turning the equipment on and off. Customers are unable to turn 
on the tanning and spa equipment from the individual rooms. Customers are 
unable to rent the tanning machine by itself and do not have the option of cleaning 
and sanitizing the equipment themselves. Customers also purchase lotions and 
other products related to the tanning process. Like the bowling patrons in the 
Boise Bowling Center case, customers of Planet Beach spas are paying for a 
service package when they use tanning and spa equipment. The Court finds that 
Petitioners are not re-selling the use of the tanning and spa equipment, and as 
such, are subject Lo liability for payment of the Idaho use tax for the tanning and 
spa equipment they purchased from their out of state franchisor. Record at pages 
35 and 36. 
The District Court properly applied Boise Bowling to the facts of this case. In Boise 
Bowing, the Court ruled that a bowling alley owner did not rent the pinsetting equipment to the 
bowling patrons and thus owed use tax on the equipment it provided in the process of providing 
bowling services to the public. The Supreme Court stated: 
We will now analyze the function of the leased automatic pinsetting machines and 
specifically with respect to whether or not it can fairly be said that these machines 
are re-rented or re-leased by the proprietors of the bowling establishments to their 
customers. Operatio11 of a bowling business involves providing the bowling 
patron with a diverse assortment of services and properties, viz., use of a bowling 
ball, use of the bowling alley, upon which the ball is thrown, use of a score sheet, 
and use of the automatic pinsetting machine. 
It is the combination of these services and properties for which a charge is exacted 
by the proprietor of the establishment. The bowling patron does not rent the 
automatic pinsetting device by itself but rather rents or pays a fee for a "package" 
The mere fact that goods bought are used for the benefit of the customer or clients 
of the purchaser in no way detracts from their character as consumer goods. The 
goods are consumed by the purchaser in furtherance of his enterprise. The fact 
that the goods are used for the benefit of the purchaser's customer or in the case 
of a bowling establishment or hotel, that the goods are used by the patrons 
themselves does not alter their character in the hand of the original purchaser 
(hotel owner or proprietor of a bowling establishment). They are and remain 
consumer goods which are consumed by the original purchaser in the course of 
his business. Id. At 369-370. 
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Here, the equipment, like the pinsetting equipment in a bowling alley, is controlled by the 
appellants. The customers do not turn the equipment on or off. That function is controlled by 
the employees of the appellants. The customers pay to receive a tan or spa service. The District 
Court correctly concluded, the customers are paying for a service package when they use tanning 
and spa equipment. This is similar to equipment at an amusement park. The customer pays 
money to ride a ride, but it cannot be said the payment is to rent the equipment used to provide 
the ride. The amusement park operator controls the operation of the ride and would owe sales or 
use tax on its purchase of the equipment. Similarly, a health club member pays to use the facility 
including the various exercise equipment in the facility. The member is not renting the exercise 
equipment, but is paying for a service package. The District Court properly determined that the 
appellants, like the bowling alley proprietors, are providing a service to their customers and are 
not renting the equipment. Like the bowling alley customers, the appellants' customers do not 
exercise control over the equipment. They cannot turn the equipment on and off, they cannot 
clean the equipment, nor can they clean the rooms where the equipment is located. It also should 
be noted, though not relied upon by the District Court, the appellants own advertising provides 
that a tanning service is being provided, not an equipment rental. See Stipulated Facts, 
Paragraph 16. (R. pg 27.) 
With most identical facts relating to this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded 
that a tanning salon did not rent the beds and related spa equipment to its customers. EnergV 
Squared, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue, 56 P.3d 686, Az. App. (2002). In that case, the 
Arizona Department of Revenue asserted that the taxpayer, an owner and operator of a tanning 
spa business, rented the beds and, therefore, should pay the Arizona transaction tax imposed on 
the business of leasing or renting tangible personal property. The taxpayer contended that it was 
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not renting the tanning beds. The Court of Appeals sided with the taxpayer holding that the 
transactions were not rentals because of the lack of control over the property by the customers. 
The Arizona Court stated: 
The business activities of the taxpayer in this case do not meet these criteria. The 
taxpayer's customers do not "themselves exclusively control all manual operations 
necessary to run" the tanning beds or booths in question. They may select within a 
five-minute window when the tanning session begins and may terminate it early. 
By design, however, the question whether a tanning session may be commenced 
at all, and the question of how long the tanning session may last, are in the 
exclusive control of the taxpayer's tanning technician. The question of which 
particular tanning device is appropriate is also significantly within the technician's 
control. In sum, the "exclusive use and control" by the customer that Peck (m 
Tux Commission v. Peck,476 P.2d 849 (Ariz. (1970)) determined to be the essence 
of "renting" within the taxing statute is not present here. Enerny Sauared, Id. at 
510 
The appellants nevertheless contend that Idaho Code 3 63-3612 is ambiguous and should 
he construed in their favor because of the rule in Futura Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 92 
Idaho 288, 442 P.2d 174 (1968). There, the Court held that if a tax statute is ambiguous, it 
should be construed in favor of the taxpayer. The appellants argue that they are renting the 
tanning beds and spas and, therefore, they purchased the equipment for resale. They contend that 
Idaho Code 5 63-3612(2)(f) and (h), based on Futura Corp, should be interpreted in a manner 
that the appellants are renting the equipment to the customer. However, this Court already 
addressed the meaning of rental in the context of the Sales Tax Act in Boise Bowling. The Court 
has given guidance on whether a transaction is a rental or a service, and there is no reason to vary 
from that standard. 
To apply the rule that statutes are to be construed in the favor of the taxpayer in this case 
leads to inconsistent results. The appellants are attempting to avoid tax on the purchase of the 
equipment by arguing that it is re-renting these items. Thus, if this is the case, it would collect 
sales tax on the rental of the equipment to its customers. If that were the case, the customers 
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would owe use tax on the rental if the appellants did not collect sales tax.   ow ever, the 
customers could argue that Idaho Code 5 63-3612 is ambiguous because it is unclear whether 
they are renting the equipment or are purchasing a service. Applying the same rule of statutory 
construction, they could argue that the statute should be construed that they are purchasing a 
service. Thus, the result of these combinations of arguments, using the same rule of statutory 
construction, would be that, from the perspective of the tanning salon owners, such as the 
appellants, the equipment is being rented, but, from the perspective of the customers, they are 
purchasing a service.' 
A better interpretation of Idaho Code 5 63-3612(h) is to determine whether the 
transaction between the spa provider and the customer is a lease or a sale of a service and then 
determine whether it is subject to sales tax that would be applied consistently to both parties to 
the transaction. The appellants' rationale for statutory construction of Idaho Code 5 63-3612(f) 
can lead to anomalous results and does not warrant this Court to overrule the holding of Boise 
Bowling. 
The District Court's Decision Does Not Violate the Idaho Constitution 
The appellants' argue that the District Court decision, and the Idaho State Tax 
Commissioil in its interpretation of Idaho Code 5 63-3612, violate Article VII, 5 5 of the Idaho 
State Constitution. There are several problems with the appellants' contention. Article VII 5 5 
provides that all taxes must be uniform upon the same class of subjects. However, this Court has 
specifically ruled that the section only applies to property taxes and not excise taxes such as sales 
and use tax. Johnson v. Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620.57 P.2d 1068 (193621 
' In this case, the appellants charge a fee to the customer, and that fee is subject to sales tax as a charge for the use of 
property or facilities for 1-ecreation. However, the customer does not owe use tax. Idaho Code 9 63-3612(f). 
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Even assuming Article VII § 5 applies to sales and use tax, the Commission's 
interpretation of Idaho Code 9 63-3612(f) is not arbitrary. The question is whether the appellants 
are renting the tanning and spa equipment to their customers. The Commission agrees with the 
District Court that they are not. The District Court relied on Boise Bowling and held that the 
appellants were providing a service. The appellanls exercise control over the equipment during 
the time the customer receives tanning services. The elemenl of control and the fact that the 
customer is receiving a package of tanning services indicates that the appellants are not renting 
out the equipment. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court held that Boise Bowling is dispositive of this case. The appellants 
have 1101 provided a good rationale to distinguish Boise Bowling. They provide spa and tanning 
services and UV Therapy to their customers. Additionally, the appellants exercise the control 
over the equipment during the time the customer receives the tanning services and spa treatment. 
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the Memorandum Decision of the District Court. 
DATED this 4 day of August, 2009. 
I 
Deputy Attorney General 
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